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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IMMIGRATION - DUE PROCESS - THE AVAILABILITY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO DETAINED CUBAN ALIENS,
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1lth Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
I. FACTS
Appellees, Cuban aliens,' brought a class action suit against the
Attorney General of the United States alleging violation of their fifth
amendment due process right to a parole revocation hearing.2 Ap-
pellees had come to the United States during the Mariel boatlift after
Appellees came to the United States in the 1980 Mariel boatlift with approx-
imately 130,000 Cuban refugees. In early April of 1980, approximately 10,800 Cuban
citizens claiming status as political refugees sought sanctuary in the Peruvian Embassy
in Havana. On April 14, 1980, President Carter declared that pursuant to the Refugee
Act of 1980, up to 3,500 of these refugees would be admitted into the United States.
President Carter allocated up to $4.25 million for their resettlement. This gave rise
to the Mariel boatlift, or "Freedom Flotilla," by which some 130,000 Cuban refugees,
in nearly 1,800 boats, came to the United States. See United States v. Frade, 709
F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1983). The United States Government denied admission to
those aliens who did not possess proper documentation, and to others who were
excludable under the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1182 (1982); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 891
(N.D. Ga 1985). See infra note 24 and accompanying text for an explanation of
the exclusion provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and for case law
that characterizes excludable aliens.
2 Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
289 (1986). The action is more specifically a consolidation of class actions brought
on behalf of the unadmitted refugees who were, are, or will be incarcerated at the
Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. Id. at 1448.
In Fernandez-Roque, 622 F. Supp. at 891, the district court divided the class into
two subclasses. The "First Group" includes criminal offenders and mentally incom-
petent persons who were sent to the United States by Castro in an attempt to rid
Cuba of such undesirables. The government has detained these aliens since their
arrival in the United States. The "Second Group" consists of all other Cuban
refugees, who the Attorney General paroled into this country under the general alien
parole statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982), but whose paroles the Attorney General
subsequently revoked. See infra note 6 for an explanation of the reasons for Appellees'
parole revocation. The Eleventh Circuit previously had found that members of the
First Group do not have any liberty interst in parole. Fernandez-Roque, 622 F.
Supp. at 891. The Eleventh Circuit addressed the Second Group's liberty interests
on appeal. Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1446.
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President Carter announced that the United States would welcome
Cuban immigrants. 3 Congress shortly thereafter enacted the Refugee
Education Assistance Act, which created a special immigration and
parole classification for Mariel Cubans. 4 The Attorney General ini-
tially denied entry to those Cuban aliens, including Appellees, who
did not have proper entry documents.' The Attorney General later
paroled most of the Appellees but subsequently revoked their parole.6
The government then detained Appellees in the Atlanta Federal Pen-
itentiary while awaiting final resolution of their applications for entry. 7
' WEEKLY COMP. P ns. Doc. 834-35 (May 5, 1980), quoted in Fernandez-Roque,
622 F. Supp. at 898, n.16.
4 Pub. L. No. 96-422, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat.) 1799
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1522 note (1982)). See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 and its
application to Mariel Cubans.
I The Attorney General also denied entry to those Cuban aliens who were mental
patients or convicted of serious crimes in Cuba under the exclusion provisions of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982). Aliens denied
admission are classified as "excludable" aliens. For an explanation of the differences
between excludable and admitted aliens, see infra notes 21-25 and accompanying
text.
6 In conjunction with this special parole classification, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) developed certain parole revocation policies applicable
only to Mariel Cubans. Fernandez-Roque, 622 F. Supp. at 895. Until May 1982 the
INS would revoke a Mariel Cuban's parole if he had no fixed address, no sponsor,
and no means of support, or if he had been convicted of a serious misdemeanor
or a felony. Id. After May 1982 the INS would revoke a Mariel Cuban's parole
only if he had been convicted of a serious misdemeanor or a felony and had completed
his prison sentence, or if he presented "a clear and imminent danger to the community
or himself." Id. In March 1983 an additional parole revocation policy was pro-
mulgated for those Mariel Cubans who had been released from the penitentiary to
halfway houses, providing for the revocation of their parole upon violation of the
conditions of their parole. Id. Over the past five years, in accordance with these
guidelines, the INS has revoked Appellees' paroles for crimes as serious as murder,
armed robbery, and aggravated assault, or for less serious crimes such as driving
under the influence. Id. at n.12. The INS has revoked the parole of many other
Mariel Cubans for noncriminal parole violations. Id.
The indefinite detention of the Cuban aliens is the product of a serious dilemma
confronting the United States Government. The United States has not admitted the
aliens, and the Cuban Government has refused them readmittance. See Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). In 1983 the Reagan
Administration informed the Cuban Government that until it agreed to the return
of the excludable aliens, the United States would halt admission of all Cubans to
this country. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1986, at 1, col. 6. This led to an immigration
accord between the United States and Cuba which was announced in December
1984. Under the accord Cuba agreed to take back 2,700 excludable aliens in exchange
for the United States taking 3,000 political prisoners and up to 20,000 regular
immigrants per year. The accord was suspended by Cuba on May 20, 1985, when
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Appellees claimed this indefinite detention violated their constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in parole.8
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Geor-
gia found that Appellees had a constitutionally-based liberty interest
in parole. 9 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court and remanded the question of whether the aliens might have
a nonconstitutionally-based liberty interest.'0 On remand, the district
court held for Appellees, finding the government's acts violative of
Appellees' nonconstitutionally-based, federally created liberty interest
in parole." The district court ordered the government to prepare and
implement a plan for providing Appellees with parole revocation
hearings.1 2
the United States began "Voice of America" broadcasts over Radio Marti. Id.
On July 2, 1986, the governments of the United States and Cuba agreed to revive
the immigration accord. Cuba first demanded that the United States discontinue
broadcasting over Radio Marti. Id. The Cuban Government then dropped that
demand, seeking instead access to "clear channel" AM frequencies in order to
broadcast throughout the United States. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
The United States Government would not agree to this, and on July 10, 1986, the
State Department announced that the talks had collapsed. No further talks are
scheduled. Id.
The government's use of detention as an alternative to placing the excludable
aliens elsewhere is addressed in Boswell, Rethinking Exclusion - The Rights of Cuban
Refugees Facing Indefinite Detention in the United States, 17 VAND. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 925 (1984).
1 Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
9 Appellees also argued that because general principles of international law forbid
prolonged arbitrary detention, their present indefinite detention was unlawful. Garcia-
Mir, 788 F.2d at 1453. The court rejected this argument reasoning that public interna-
tional law applies only in the absence of controlling executive or legislative acts, or judi-
cial opinions. Since controlling executive acts existed, as well as judicial decisions, the
court deemed international law inapplicable. Id., aff'g Fernandez-Roque, 622 F.
Supp. at 887.
For a complete history of the proceedings, see Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671
F.2d 426 (11 th Cir. 1982) (considering the jurisdictional issues raised by the issuance
of a temporary restraining order preventing the government from deporting Mariel
Cubans); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984) (excludable
Cuban aliens do not have a constitutionally-based liberty interest in parole); Garcia-
Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (1lth Cir. 1985) (considering the scope and effect of
a Status Review Plan promulgated by the Attorney General and its effect on the
parole of some excludable Cuban aliens); Fernandez-Roque, 622 F. Supp. at 887
(excludable Cuban aliens have a nonconstitutionally-based liberty interest in parole).
10 Fernandez-Roque, 734 F.2d at 576. A nonconstitutionally-based liberty interest
is one which is federally created, and although not arising from the Constitution,
it gives rise to due process protection. Id.
1 Fernandez-Roque, 622 F. Supp. at 904.
12 Id. The district court limited its holding to those aliens who had not been
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The government subsequently filed emergency motions with the
Eleventh Circuit to stay the district court's order. 3 The court of
appeals denied the government's motion for a stay of the order to
prepare the plan but granted the government's motion to stay im-
plementation of the plan.14 The court of appeals then heard the case
on the merits to determine whether the district court correctly found
a nonconstitutionally-based liberty interest in parole. 5 On appeal,
held: reversed. Unadmitted aliens, a class of Mariel Cuban refugees
accorded special immigration and parole status by the Refugee Ed-
ucation Assistance Act, do not have a nonconstitutionally-based due
process liberty interest entitling them to parole revocation hearings.
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (l1th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1980 thousands of Cuban refugees entered the United States in
the "Freedom Flotilla.' 1 6 The Freedom Flotilla began in late April
1980, and President Jimmy Carter stated his position on the situation
soon thereafter. In an address before the League of Women Voters
in May of 1980, President Carter announced that the United States
mental patients and who had not committed serious crimes in Cuba. Id. The court
held that each of these aliens was entitled to a hearing at which his continued
detention must be justified by a showing "that he is likely to abscond, to pose a
risk to the national security, or to pose a serious and significant threat to persons
or property within the United States." Id. The district court found that the procedures
that must be included in a constitutionally adequate detention hearing included: (1)
written notice and disclosure of evidence; (2) presentation of evidence by the alien;
(3) confrontation and cross-examination; (4) a neutral hearing body; and (5) a written
statement of the basis for a decision. Fernandez-Roque, 567 F. Supp. at 1134-36.
The district court further found that the Cuban aliens were entitled to the additional
procedural protections of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel,
and the placing of the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence on the
government. Id. at 1137-40.
13 Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450 (lth Cir. 1986). In addition, the gov-
ernment sought summary reversal on the merits, which the court of appeals denied.
Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455.
4 Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455.
11 The court of appeals additionally ordered that two other issues be decided in
the new action. The first questioned the applicability of public international law,
discussed supra note 9. The second concerned whether the class should continue to
be maintained, which the court of appeals dismissed as moot in view of their decision
that Appellees had no further recourse in the courts. Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455.
16 See supra note 1 for a discussion of the circumstances leading up to the
Freedom Flotilla.
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would welcome "with an open heart and open arms"' 7 those Cubans
who wished to immigrate to this country. In that speech President
Carter recognized the possibility that tens of thousands of Cuban
refugees would come in the Mariel boatlift and declared that the
United States would receive them "with understanding, as expedi-
tiously as we can .... "I'
In response to the influx of Cuban and Haitian refugees, Congress
enacted the Refugee Education Assistance Act (REAA). 9 The REAA
created a special immigration classification for Cubans and Haitians. 20
Through this classification, the government treated Cuban aliens in
many respects more generously than it normally treats excludable
aliens. 21
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980 (1980 Act), which
governs excludable aliens, does not provide such aliens with many
of the rights given to aliens deemed admitted. 22 An admitted alien
11 Fernandez-Roque, 622 F. Supp. at 898, n. 16 (quoting President Carter's address
to the League of Women Voters).
11 Id. President Carter's speech was interpreted to signify governmental approval
of the boatlift. See N.Y. Times, May 6, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
,9 Pub. L. No. 96-422, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (94 Stat.) 1799
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1522 note (1982)).
20 This classification defines "Cuban and Haitian entrant" in the following man-
ner:
(1) any individual granted parole status as a Cuban/Haitian (Status
Pending) or granted any other special status subsequently established under
the immigration laws for nationals of Cuba or Haiti, regardless of the
status of the individual at the time assistance or services are provided; and
(2) any other national of Cuba or Haiti
(A) who
(i) was paroled into the United States and has not acquired any other
status under the Immigration and Nationality Act;
(ii) is the subject of exclusion or deportation proceedings under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, or
(iii) has an application pending with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service; and
(B) with respect to whom a final, nonappealable, and legally enforceable
order of deportation or exclusion has not been entered.
Id. § 1501(e).
2, See Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1451. The REAA includes a section which is
applicable only to Mariel Cubans and Haitian refugees. 8 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982).
This section enumerates procedures for the furnishing of assistance "for the proc-
essing, care, maintenance, security, transportation, and initial reception and place-
ment in the United States of Cuban and Haitian entrants." Id. § 1501(c)(l)(A).
228 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982). Chapter IV subjects those seeking admission to
"exclusion proceedings" to determine whether they "shall be allowed to enter or
shall be excluded and deported." Id. § 1226(a). Chapter V concerns aliens who
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is one who has gained entry into the United States, whether legally
or illegally. The government must provide an admitted alien with due
process proceedings before expelling him. 23 An excludable alien is one
who has not yet gained entry into the United States, such as an alien
whom the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has taken
into custody at the border. 24 The INS may exclude such an alien
without proceedings conforming to due process.2 5
A court determining the due process rights of an alien may review
the determinations made by the INS. 26 At least one circuit has found
that the circumstances surrounding an alien's entry into the United
States may change the status of an excludable alien. In United States
ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff," the Second Circuit found that a
presidential proclamation, coupled with legislative action, effected a
change in the status of an excludable alien so that the INS should
consider him constructively admitted. 28 In Paktorovics the Attorney
already have entered the United States, and who are subject to "expulsion" if they
fall within certain "general classes of deportable aliens." Id. § 1251.
The new Immigration Reform and Control Act, discussed at infra note 85, does
not grant any new rights to excludable aliens.
23 Rules regarding aliens who have gained entry into the United States are set
forth in Chapter V of the Act. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-60 (1982). Decisions illustrating
the distinction between the two classes of aliens include Leng May Ma v. Barber,
357 U.S. 185 (1958) (United States immigration laws distinguish between aliens
seeking admission and those who have entered); Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on
different footing from admitted alien); Maldonado-Sandoval v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975) (differences between exclusion
proceedings for excludable aliens and deportation proceedings for admitted aliens
are significant).
24 Chapter IV of the Act sets forth the rules regarding aliens seeking admission
into the United States and subjects these aliens to exclusion proceedings. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1221-30 (1982). See also United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla.
1980) (en banc), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272
(I1th Cir. 1982) (to accomplish "entry," alien must be present in the United States
and be free of official restraint).
8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1982).
26While many courts have held that judicial review of INS or Attorney General
decisions with respect to aliens is limited to determinations involving a final order
of deportation, see Moret v. Karn, 746 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1984), Holley v. Immigration
and Naturalization Serv., 727 F.2d 189 (Ist Cir. 1984), other courts have interpreted
the scope of their judicial review more broadly. See infra notes 45-49 and accom-
panying text.
260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
28 Id. at 614. The court, held that the President's act could not change the law,
but it could effect a change in status sufficient to entitle the alien to constitutional
protection. Id.
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General had paroled Appellant, a Hungarian refugee, who was being
held in a United States prison. 29 The Attorney General subsequently
revoked Appellant's parole without a hearing when government of-
ficials discovered his membership in the Communist Party.30 Appellant
had come to the United States because of President Eisenhower's
public pronouncements welcoming to the United States Hungarian
refugees seeking escape from persecution in their home country.3
Appellant argued that this "invitation" effected a change in his alien
status, and that he should therefore be deemed admitted to the United
States.32 The Second Circuit agreed with Appellant, holding that the
President's invitation provided the alien with a change in classifi-
cation.33 The court ruled that because Appellant was an admitted
alien and thus had a constitutional right to parole, the government
was required to provide Appellant with a parole revocation hearing.3 4
If an alien is unable to gain entry into the United States, the INS
will consider the alien excludable under the exclusion provisions of
the 1980 Act. 5 Under this Act the INS must attempt to deport an
29 Because the alien in this instance applied for and was granted parole into the
United States prior to coming from Hungary and thus did not "enter" the country
of his own volition, he was considered an excludable alien. Id. at 611.
30 Paktorovics denied that he had communistic tendencies, and the United States
officials handling the matter subsequently abandoned the issue of his communist
connections. Instead, he was ruled to be deportable on the sole ground of his failure
to produce a visa which neither he nor any other Hungarian refugee in his class
possessed. Id. at 612.
11 Id. at 613. The pronouncements that Paktorovics relied on were in President
Eisenhower's Message to Congress on January 31, 1957. The President's message
discussed the plight of the "[t]housands of men, women, and children [who] have
fled their homes to escape Communist suppression." Id. President Eisenhower stated
that "[olur position of world leadership demands that, in partnership with the other
nations of the free world, we be in a position to grant asylum." Id. at 613-14.
32 Id. at 614.
1 Id. This change entitled Paktorovics to the constitutional protections generally
reserved for admitted aliens. See infra note 60 and accompanying text for an
explanation of the rights granted to admitted aliens.
34 The court also considered the precedential effect of the decision in ruling for
Appellant. If the court held for the government, the effect would be disastrous on
the tens of thousands of other Hungarian refugees who came to the United States
as a result of the President's promulgation of United States foreign policy. The
United States could force these refugees to leave "on the mere say-so of a Government
official, however unreasonable and capricious this say-so may be, and even if there
is no basis whatever for such a ruling . . . . Under the special circumstances of the
case of these Hungarian refugees, we think their parole may not be revoked without
a hearing .. . ." Id. at 612.
35 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982). The INS will then determine whether the alien will
be allowed to enter, or whether he will be deported. Id. § 1226(a).
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excludable alien immediately.3 6 If the INS is unable to deport the
alien promptly, the 1980 Act provides for the alien's temporary
detention until final disposition of his entry application.3 7 Once the
INS detains an excludable alien, the 1980 Act provides for the pos-
sibility of his parole into the United States. 38 The decision to parole
falls within the discretion of the Attorney General.3 9
The Supreme Court has upheld the Attorney General's broad dis-
cretionary power to revoke or deny parole to an excludable alien
without first granting the alien a revocation hearing. In Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei,4° the Court recognized this broad
discretionary power by ruling that the government properly detained
an excludable alien while attempting to deport him. Mezei claimed
that since an alien parole statute existed, he had a right to be paroled
into the United States. The Court held that an excludable alien has
"not entered" the United States despite his presence here, and there-
fore could not challenge the Attorney General's discretionary pro-
cedures.4'
36 Id. § 1227. "Any alien (other than an alien crewman) arriving in the United
States who is excluded under this Act, shall be immediately deported to the country
whence he came ... unless the Attorney General, in an individual case, in his
discretion, concludes that immediate deportation is not practicable or proper." Id.
§ 1227(a).
37 Id. § 1225(b). The courts have long upheld the temporary detention of excludable
aliens awaiting deportation. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896).
It was impossible for the Mariel Cubans to return to Cuba due to a deterioration
in relations between the United States and Cuba. See supra note 7 for a discussion
of attempts to return Appellees to Cuba.
38 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982). The Attorney General is permitted "in his
discretion [to] parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as
he may prescribe for emergent reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any
alien applying for admission to the United States." Id.
39 Section 1182(d)(5)(A) is further implemented by the regulation found at 8
C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (1986). This regulation permits the district director in charge of
a port of entry to parole into the United States temporarily, any alien applying for
admission provided the alien satisfies various conditions found in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(c)
(1986). It should be noted, however, that the authority of the district director to
parole is subject to the discretion of the Attorney General. Id. Moreover, courts
have found it improper to interfere with the Attorney General's decision in granting
parole. The Attorney General's discretionary power to grant parole to an excludable
alien, as well as judicial review of such decision, is discussed in Note, The Indefinite
Detention of Excluded Aliens: Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 1981 DET. C.L. REv. 925,
928-31 (1981).
o 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
I4 d. at 212.
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In Jean v. Nelson 42, the Court relied on Mezei in ruling that
indefinitely incarcerated Haitian aliens could not challenge the At-
torney General's decision to incarcerate them without first providing
the aliens with a hearing. The Court decided that excludable aliens
do not have standing to question the INS's parole policies. The aliens
in Jean contended that the INS discriminated against Haitain entrants
since its immigration policy centered on race and national origin.
The Court found this discrimination constitutionally permissible, hold-
ing that the fifth amendment does not apply to the parole of un-
admitted entrants. 43
Under the 1980 Act a court's jurisdiction to review INS determi-
nations is limited to "final orders of deportation."" Many courts,
however, have interpreted the statutory provision broadly, upholding
review of all matters which affect the final order. 45 Thus, courts have
reviewed matters even where the challenge was to the denial of an
adjustment in status.46 In Marino v. INS 47, the Second Circuit ruled
that the denial of an adjustment in an alien's status is subject to
judicial review to determine whether the immigration judge correctly
applied appropriate standards. 48 Moreover, the Second Circuit's re-
42 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985).
41 Id. at 2999.
4" 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982). "The procedure prescribed by, and all the provisions
of the Act of December 29, 1950 ... shall apply to, and shall be the sole and
exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation here-
tofore or hereafter made against aliens within the United States .... ." Id.
41 Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980);
see also Bae v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 706 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1983);
Marino v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 537 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1976).
46 See Bagamasbad v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 531 F.2d 111 (3d
Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 24 (1976) (rule of review of final
deportation orders obtains even where challenge seeks review only of a denial of
an adjustment of status); Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F. Supp. 35 (D.C. Cal. 1980)
(district court has jurisdiction to review denial by INS of an adjustment in status).
,1 Marino, 537 F.2d at 690. The 1980 Act provides for an adjustment of a
temporary alien's status, upon fulfilling the requirements of the section, to that of
a person lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982). The
adjustment of status from admitted alien to permanent resident is used here as an
analogy to the "adjustment" of the status, by President Carter's proclamation, of
an excludable alien to that of an admitted alien.
41 In Marino an immigration judge had denied an alien's application for ad-
justment of status to that of permanent residence on the grounds that the alien had
been convicted in Italy of a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982). The Second Circuit ruled that as the Italian tribunal
had prevented the alien from appealing the decision, the Italian conviction had never
become final, and thus the alien was not rendered ineligible for adjustment of status.
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view of the Attorney General's decision to exclude an alien in Pak-
torovics shows that a court may in certain circumstances review INS
determinations other than deportation orders. 49
III. COMMENT
The Eleventh Circuit based its decision in Garcia-Mir v. Meese °
on the premise that Appellees as excludable aliens have no consti-
tutional rights.' The court failed, however, to address the primary
issue of whether Appellees should be classified as admitted aliens.
The court rejected Appellees' claim of a constitutionally-based liberty
interest in parole on the grounds that a right to parole arises from
the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment.52 The court reasoned
that Appellees could not assert such a right absent a privilege to
claim constitutional protections generally. In so holding the court
relied on precedent that permits excludable aliens to claim only those
constitutional rights provided to them by specific legislation.53 Con-
sequently, the court found that for Appellees to successfully claim
a constitutionally-based liberty interest in parole, they must point to
a legislative act granting them constitutional protection.5 4 The court
found no such legislative act. 5 Therefore, by deciding the case in
Marino, 537 F.2d at 690. In so holding the court found that the immigration judge's
ruling on this matter was subject to judicial review, even though it could not be
considered the final order of deportation as set forth in the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)
(1982). Marino, 537 F.2d at 690.
49 Paktorovics, 260 F.2d at 615. The court stated:
We do not say that the discretion of the courts should be substituted
for the discretion to be exercised by . . . law. We do say that there must
be a hearing which will give assurance that the discretion of the Attorney
General shall be exercised against a background of facts fairly contested
in the open.
Id.
50 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
1I Id. at 1449. The court relied on Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212, for the premise that
excludable aliens cannot look to the Constitution to challenge adverse proceedings.
For other cases illustrating this point, see Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590 (1953) (aliens denied entry do not enjoy constitutional rights); In re Cahill, 447
F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1971) (same).
12 Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1450.
13 Id. For excludable aliens, "the decisions of executive or administrative officers,
acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law."
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
14 Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1450.
11 The court ruled that the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, supra note
4, cannot be read as setting in place the necessary limits on discretion because the
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this manner, the court avoided a constitutional question and resolved
the case on narrow grounds.16
The Eleventh Circuit next examined the merits of Appellees' claim
of a protected, nonconstitutionally-based liberty interest." The trial
court had found such a protected interest, ruling that President
Carter's invitation, as well as the creation of a special immigration
classification for Mariel Cubans, limited the Attorney General's dis-
cretion to revoke an alien's parole. The trial court found that this
discretionary limitation resulted in a nonconstitutional liberty interest
in parole protected by the Constitution. 8 The court of appeals dis-
agreed with this analysis, noting a lack of precedent to support the
trial court's reasoning. 9
In their analyses both the trial court and the Eleventh Circuit failed
to address the threshold question of Appellees' alien status. The
courts began with the premise that Appellees were excludable aliens
purpose of that Act was not to effect parole. Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1452.
The court also evaluated Appellees' argument that nonconstitutionally-based liberty
interests could arise absent particularized limitations on official discretion. Appellees
relied on Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), in claiming that a state's grant
of freedom to a prisoner creates a nonconstitutional liberty interest, regardless of
the existence of particularized standards limiting discretion. The court rejected this
argument finding "a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has
... and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979), quoted in Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1453. Since
the court assumed Appellees were excludable aliens, they had no liberty. Any re-
semblance to liberty was merely an extension of their detention. Id. See Leng May
Ma, 357 U.S. at 185; see also Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod, 193 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill.
1960).
36 The issue the court failed to address was whether the Constitution applied to
excludable aliens to the extent of giving them constitutionally-protected, nonconsti-
tutionally-based due process rights. It should be noted, however, that a court always
should avoid deciding a case on a constitutional question when alternate grounds
exist, see Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); (Brandeis, J., concurring). The
alternate grounds chosen by the Eleventh Circuit in this case, however, were not
necessarily those that would provide the better-reasoned result. See infra notes 73-
76 and accompanying text.
11 The court did not have to consider the nonconstitutional liberty interest claim
since its holding that excludable aliens are not entitled to any constitutional rights,
practically speaking, nullified Appellees' claim. Presumably the court went further
to protect itself in the event of an appeal.
,' See Fernandez-Roque, 622 F. Supp. at 887.
' Appellees referred the court of appeals to Paktorovics to evidence the prop-
osition that the President's act created a liberty interest. The court rejected this
argument. Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1451. See infra notes 67-74 for a discussion of
the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of Paktorovics.
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and thus failed to consider whether executive action had changed
Appellees' status to admitted aliens. This consideration is vital because
once the United States admits an alien, he is afforded a variety of
constitutional rights. 60 Although the INS may exclude an alien using
provisions of the 1980 Act, 61 certain circumstances can effect a change
in the alien's status and in the constitutional protection he can expect.
One example of the circumstances which can effect a change in
an alien's status is found in the Paktorovics case. 62 In that case the
Second Circuit found that because Appellant came to the United
States in response to the President's invitation, the United States had
effectively admitted him. 63 The court determined that while the Pres-
ident could not change the law by inviting Hungarian refugees to
the United States, he could alter their legal rights by changing their
immigration status. 64 Subsequently, the Second Circuit concluded that
the Constitution required a hearing prior to the revocation of Ap-
pellant's parole. 65
The Eleventh Circuit should have applied the Paktorovics reasoning
and afforded Appellees in Garcia-Mir admitted status. This appli-
60 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (the children of illegal aliens have
a right to free public education); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
(undocumented aliens have a liberty interest in welfare benefits); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915) (right to earn living in common callings); but see Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Congress has no duty to give all aliens the full benefits
of citizenship).
61 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982). See supra note 35 and accompanying text for an
explanation of how and why the INS may exclude an alien.
62 Paktorovics, 260 F.2d at 610. For an explanation of the Paktorovics decision
and the circumstances that led to the court's determination that Appellant was to
be treated as an admitted alien, see supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
63 The Second Circuit held Appellant had been admitted not only due to the
presidential invitation, but also because of the legislative enactment endorsing the
President's act. Paktorovics, 260 F.2d at 614. The Paktorovics decision may be
interpreted to imply that such legislative action is not necessary, as the court held
that the tender and acceptance of such an invitation alone creates a change in an
alien's status. Id.
6" Id. The court stated:
True it is that the President has no power to change the law by inviting
Paktorovics and the other Hungarian refugees to come here, but this is
not to say that the tender of such an invitation and its acceptance by him
did not effect a change in the status of Paktorovics sufficient to entitle
him to the protection of our Constitution.
Id. The Second Circuit's ruling supports the conclusion that reliance on an executive
act can give rise to a change in an alien's status.
65 Id. The court's ruling illustrates that a court may find that an alien, whom
the government originally classed excludable, could undergo a change of status to
that of an alien now admitted to the United States.
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cation would have resulted in a better-reasoned and equitable decision.
Instead, the Eleventh Circuit found that Paktorovics was sui generis
and must be limited to its facts. 66 The facts presented in Paktorovics,
however, were essentially identical to the facts of Garcia-Mir. Al-
though the Second Circuit's opinion is only persuasive authority, the
Eleventh Circuit should have more thoroughly considered the appli-
cation of the Paktorovics reasoning in this situation. The Eleventh
Circuit misinterpreted the Paktorovics decision and, as a result, failed
to see that the President's proclamation had in effect admitted Ap-
pellees to the United States. This error ultimately resulted in the
denial of Appellees' constitutional rights.
The Eleventh Circuit misinterpreted Paktorovics as holding that a
presidential proclamation created a nonconstitutionally-based liberty
interest to benefit an excludable alien. 67 The court distinguished Pak-
torovics by stating that in Paktorovics, Congress had subsequently
enacted legislation endorsing the President's action. The Eleventh
Circuit ruled that the REAA did not satisfy the standard set forth
in Paktorovics because the REAA was not enacted to endorse Pres-
ident Carter's proclamation. 68
The Eleventh Circuit should have interpreted Paktorovics as holding
that the President's invitation to a class of refugees to come to the
United States changes their status from excludable to admitted aliens. 69
66 Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1451, n.5. A sui generis decision is "[oif its own kind
or class." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (5th ed. 1979). The court in Paktorovics
considered that their decision was sui generis, but this does not preclude the Eleventh
Circuit from utilizing the Second Circuit's reasoning when presented with analogous
facts.
67 Id.
" Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1452. The trial court in Fernandez-Roque had identified
creation of a special immigration classification as the legislative enactment to support
the President's act. The Eleventh Circuit rejected a similar holding because Congress
did not enact the REAA to specifically endorse the President's proclamation. The
REAA can be viewed as a tacit endorsement of the President's act, however, because
of its substance and its timing. If the Eleventh Circuit had utilized the reasoning
first set out in Paktorovics, thus taking the view that the President's act had admitted
the aliens, it would not be necessary to look to a legislative enactment. See supra
notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
69 The author's view is that a presidential act can alter the status of an alien.
As a result of the inherent executive power over immigration and broad delegations
of discretionary authority set forth in the Act, the separation-of-powers doctrine
places few restrictions on executive officials dealing with aliens seeking admission
to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A), (f), 1185(a)(1) (1982); Jean v.
Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (lth Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985); Executive
Order No. 12172, 1-101 et. seq., 8 U.S.C. § 1182 note (1982). Although this
proposition would more directly apply to the acts of the Attorney General, it can
be extended to apply to all executive officials, including the President.
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Such a change creates substantial constitutional due process rights in
Appellees. 70 The court was justified in reviewing the INS decision to
exclude the aliens, just as other circuits have reviewed INS decisions.7'
The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not address the threshold question
of whether Appellees' status was that of excludable or admitted aliens
and thus deprived Appellees of constitutional protection. This was a
poor way to address the problem in light of public policy that prohibits
an individual's unnecessary, prolonged detention. 72 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit's reasoning was faulty for not addressing the vital threshold
question of Appellees' status, and this faulty reasoning will have
great impact on the nearly two thousand Mariel Cubans being detained
in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. 73
Appellees were not seeking a grant of freedom from the Eleventh
Circuit, only an opportunity to be heard as the first step toward that
freedom. 74 Parole revocation hearings would give Appellees the chance
to present their cases and provide the INS the opportunity to determine
the feasibility of releasing each individual Appellee. Such a process
diminishes the possibility that Appellees, if released from prison,
would endanger themselves or the community. 7 If any of these aliens
70 See supra note 60 for authority illustrating the constitutional due process rights
vested in admitted aliens.
71 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982). The Eleventh Circuit had the power of judicial
review over the Attorney General's classification of Appellees as excludable aliens.
See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text for discussion of how various circuits
have defined their power to review INS determinations.
72 Although the Eleventh Circuit found that international law is not applicable
where controlling legislative or executive acts exist, see supra note 9, one may look
to general principles of international law to find examples of public policy pro-
mulgated by our nation and others. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
The American Convention on Human Rights, 77 DEPT. STATE. BULL. 28 (1977)
provides that no one shall be subject to an arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. Likewise,
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/801 (1948), provides
that no one shall be subject to an arbitrary detention. The European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(1953), provides that one deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to a prompt
determination of the lawfulness of the detention.
71 In Paktorovics the Second Circuit evaluated equitable considerations in reaching
its conclusion. The court reasoned that to rule against Appellant would have disastrous
effects on the whole class of Hungarian refugees.
14 These aliens have been living freely in American society since their arrival in
the United States. Consequently, when they entered the penitentiary, many left
behind wives and children who are United States citizens. See Fernandez-Roque, 622
F. Supp. at 895, n.12.
71 The Eleventh Circuit's chosen analysis led to a conclusion that was not wholly
improper. The court justifiably found that absent a limitation on the Attorney
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were, in fact, a danger to themselves or society, a parole hearing
would bring this fact to light, and the alien would not be released.
The Act provides for the exclusion of aliens with a history of
criminal conduct or mental incompetence, 76 but most Appellees had
no such record, 7 Although the fact that many of these aliens had
committed crimes in the United States could be considered by the
INS for parole purposes, it does not affect the fact that the President's
actions initially admitted Appellees. The Eleventh Circuit should have
seen these aliens as admitted, and as such, the aliens would be entitled
to the protections that are afforded by our Constitution to all persons
convicted of crimes.
78
General's discretion to grant parole, excludable aliens could not claim a noncon-
stitutionally-based, protected liberty interest in parole. Furthermore, policy consid-
erations regarding the feasibility of granting parole hearings, and ultimately parole,
to thousands of refugees provided strong reasons for rejecting Appellees' claims. It
is this author's contention, however, that the Eleventh Circuit's chosen analysis was
not the best approach to the situation, and that the policy considerations of ad-
ministrative feasibility are secondary to the protection of Appellees' basic human
rights.
76 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)-(4), (9), (10), (23) (1982).
11 According to Judge Shoob, there are only 300 to 400 Mariel Cubans in the
Atlanta Federal Penitentiary who had criminal records in Cuba or a history of
mental incompetence which resulted in their never being paroled into the United
States. Fernandez-Roque, 622 F. Supp. at 891. The rest of the Mariel Cuban inmate
population of over 1,800 consists of those who were initially paroled into the United
States and subsequently had their paroles revoked. See supra note 2 for an explanation
of how the district court divided the class into two sub-classes. See supra note 6
for the Attorney General's reasons for revoking Appellees' parole.
11 One charged with a crime in the United States has numerous rights under the
United States Constitution. Y. KAmisAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRUMINAL
PROCEDURE 13-27 (1974). The fifth amendment guarantees an accused individual the
right to a grand jury indictment, the right not to be placed in double jeopardy, the
right not to incriminate one's self, and the right not to be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The sixth amendment
guarantees an accused individual the right to a speedy trial, the right to an impartial
jury, the right of notice, the right to confront adverse witnesses, and the right to
an attorney. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The seventh amendment grants the accused
the right to a trial by jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The eighth amendment
guarantees an accused criminal the right to bail and the right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishments. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. These rights are granted to
an admitted alien charged with a crime in the United States, regardless of whether
he entered the country legally or illegally. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 228 (due
process clause of fifth amendment applicable to aliens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886) (equal protection of the laws to all persons, including aliens). The
courts have found that excludable aliens are not entitled to these constitutional
protections. See supra note 51.
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The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in this
case, 79 and as a result, the ramifications of the Eleventh Circuit's
decision will be far-reaching and damaging to the Mariel Cubans
being detained in this country. The government detains virtually all
Cuban refugees in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, s0 and therefore,
the Eleventh Circuit will hear any future actions brought by these
aliens. The Eleventh Circuit, however, in dismissing this action, ruled
that Appellees had exhausted all the legal possibilities in their attempt
to regain their freedom. 8' Although the decision does not preclude
the Mariel Cubans from bringing future actions, in light of the
Eleventh Circuit's position in Garcia-Mir, it is unlikely that such
actions will be successful.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision answers the question of whether
the Constitution affords safeguards to excludable Cuban refugees.
The decision, however, does not provide any hope for the Cubans
being indefinitely detained in Atlanta. Appellees' only hope for free-
dom at this point lies in the new INS release program.8 2 Attempting
to gain parole through this program, however, will be a slow if not
futile process applicable only to a small number of Appellees.83 If
79 Cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
80 There are approximately 1,300 Cuban aliens being held in INS detention centers
and county jails nationwide, but under a new INS release program, these aliens are
in the process of being moved to Atlanta. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Nov. 8,
1986, at IA, col. 1 (hereinafter Journal-Consitution). For a discussion of the INS's
new release program and its possible effects on Appellees, see infra notes 82-83 and
accompanying text.
SI Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455.
82 The INS's new release program, announced Friday, November 7, 1986, provides
that between 500 and 700 Cuban detainees at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary will
be moved to a minimum-security detention center for rehabilitation and eventual
parole. Journal-Constitution at IA, col. 1. These aliens will receive educational and
vocational training at a detention facility in Oakdale, Louisiana, and then will be
evaluated for possible parole to halfway houses. Id. Only 45 Cubans, however, are
initially being moved to Oakdale, and the population of Cuban detainees in Atlanta
will remain constant in the foreseeable future because as eligible Cubans are moved
out, detainees from other institutions will be transferred to Atlanta. Id. at 20A, col.
6.
This program does not provide adequate resolution of the plight facing Appellees
because the process is slow, taking up to two years to process all eligible Cuban
detainees. Moreover, the program only applies to a small percentage of Appellees.
Id. at IA, col. 1. The plan does not appear to provide for preliminary hearings at
which a detainee can present a case for his eligibility to the program. Furthermore,
the program will not provide eligible detainees with total freedom because eventual
parole will be to halfway houses. Id. at IA, col. 1.
11 The program simply does not provide Appellees with the opportunities that
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the Eleventh Circuit had found that Appellees were admitted aliens,
Appellees would have been eligible for parole revocation hearings as
well as other constitutional protections.8 4 This would provide a more
practical means of protecting Appellees.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that Congress will take any action to
alleviate Appellees' situation in light of the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986.85 This new Act is inapplicable to
excludable Cuban aliens, including Appellees, following the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Garcia-Mir. Appellees have been singled out as
a class, and it is inconsistent with United States ideals of fairness
and democracy that they should remain in jail indefinitely, long after
they have served the sentences for any crimes committed in the United
States .6
IV. CONCLUSION
Appellees came to the United States in reliance on President Carter's
public pronouncement that the United States Government would wel-
constitutional protection would provide. The only possibility for Appellees to receive
constitutional protection is for a court to determine that presidential action altered
their status to that of admitted aliens.
14 See supra note 60 for authority that illustrates the constitutional due process
rights vested in admitted aliens.
85 S. 1200, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H10068-91 (daily ed. Oct. 14,
1986). The new law provides for the legalization of status of illegal aliens who
entered the United States before January 1, 1982, to that of persons admitted for
lawful residence. Id. at H10076. Although it is not known how many aliens are
eligible for legalization through the new provisions, see Lauter, Immigration Law's
New Sweep, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 3, 1986, at 3, col. 1, it is clear that excludable aliens
being detained in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary are not eligible. The new law
states that "any alien . . . who is a national of Cuba or Haiti, who arrived in the
United States before January 1, 1982" is eligible for adjustment of status "to that
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if . . . the alien is otherwise
eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is otherwise admissible to the United States
for permanent residence . . . ." 132 CONG. REC. at H10078. In this way Congress
makes the new law inapplicable to excludable Cuban entrants. The law makes an
exception for those aliens who are excludable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1982)
for lack of proper entry documents, as well as seven other excludable classes
inapplicable to Appellees. Id. While the new law grants legally admitted status to
the majority of Mariel Cubans who came to the United States in the Mariel boatlift
prior to 1982, Appellees have been considered excludable aliens, and as such they
are not affected by the new law. By presuming Appellees were excludable aliens,
and thus not addressing the issue of whether executive action changed Appellees'
status, the Eleventh Circuit has denied Appellees the opportunity to be granted
"amnesty" with regard to their status under the new law.
86 See supra note 6 for a discussion of the different crimes and violations Appellees
have committed which led the Attorney General to revoke their parole.
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come them into the country.87 Appellees were excluded from entry
but paroled into the United States by the Attorney General. The
Attorney General subsequently revoked Appellees' parole and has
been detaining them indefinitely in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary
pending Cuba's decision to take them back.88
The government's detention of Appellees without due process hear-
ings is unfair in light of policy considerations8 9 and case authority
enabling the Eleventh Circuit to consider their status. 9° The Eleventh
Circuit should have addressed the issue of whether President Carter's
actions had admitted Appellees, thus providing Appellees with certain
constitutional protections. Not only would this have resulted in a
better-reasoned opinion, but also it would have been a more equitable
solution to the problem of Cuban detention. 91 In the Garcia-Mir
decision, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the problem meekly, declining
to put an end to the detained Marielitos' desperate situation.
Elizabeth Gail Marlowe
87 See supra note. 3.
88 See supra notes 7, 37 and accompanying text for discussion of the government's
indefinite detention of excludable aliens. See supra note 7 for discussion of the
United States efforts asking Cuba to readmit the aliens.
89 See supra note 72 for explanation of the United States and other countries'
public policies that prohibit indefinite detention of excludable aliens.
90 See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text for discussion of how various
circuits have defined their scope of judicial review over INS determinations. See
also notes 61-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Paktorovics decision,
demonstrating how another circuit handled a situation with facts similar to those
presented in Garcia-Mir.
91 See supra note 73 for an explanation of the Second Circuit's consideration of
equitable ramifications when presented with a case factually similar to that of Garcia-
Mir.
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